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as a remedial measure and would inhibit courts from making state
policy in the form of permanent legislative apportionments.
David R. Johnson
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-WHARTON'S RULE-ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL ACT OF 1970-The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that separate convictions for conspiracy to commit and com-
pletion of a federal gambling offense are not subject to the presump-
tion of merger created by Wharton's Rule because Congress in-
tended to retain each offense as an independent weapon in combat-
ing organized crime.
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
In the fall of 1970, United States Attorney General Mitchell au-
thorized wiretaps on the telephones at the Robert E. lannelli resi-
dence in suburban Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.' The evidence gath-
ered was used to indict lannelli and several others on charges of
conspiring to violate and violating § 1955 of Title 18,2 a federal
gambling statute which outlaws combinations of five or more per-
sons to conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own a gam-
bling business prohibited by state law. One of defendants' pretrial
motions urged dismissal of the conspiracy count brought under §
1. United States v. lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171, 174 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970). This section of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
imposes upon violators a fine not in excess of $20,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than
five years. As used in § 1955, an "illegal gambling business"
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is con-
ducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct,
or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in
excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $20,000 in any single day.
Id.
Title 18 of the United States Code defines an illegal gambling business in § 1955 as
meaning, inter alia, one which has a gross revenue of $20,000 in any single day. This is a
misprint, as the Statutes at Large report the requirement for gross revenue in any single day
at $2,000. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803, 84 Stat. 937. In
18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (Supp. 1976), the figure reported is $2,000. The Supreme Court listed the
requirement at $2,000 but inaccurately cited the United States Code for this purpose. lannelli
v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 772 n.2 (1975).
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371 of Title 181 because it duplicated the charge under § 1955. Ac-
knowledging commission of a substantive offense is generally sepa-
rate and distinct from a conspiracy to commit the offense,4 the
defendants claimed Wharton's Rule should be applied to merge the
two in this case;' the motion was denied. Jannelli was convicted and
sentenced under both counts.' The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed, finding no merger on the basis of a recognized
exception to Wharton's Rule pertaining to the number of partici-
pants involved in the crime;7 there was no possible application of
Wharton's Rule, because a § 1955 violation required a minimum of
five participants and more than five were charged in the indict-
ment.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari' to resolve conflicting
3. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). This statute provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons
conspire . to commit any offense against the United States... and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id.
4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (convictions for conspiracy to
violate and several substantive violations of the Internal Revenue Code).
5. United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171, 181 (W.D. Pa. 1972). For a discussion of
Wharton's Rule see text accompanying notes 31-49 infra.
6. lannelli was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) for mailing gambling para-
phernalia, and under 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970) for using a fictitious name for the purpose of
conducting unlawful bookmaking activities by means of the Postal Service. Each petitioner
was fined and sentenced to imprisonment and a subsequent term of probation on the § 1955
charge, and an additional probationary period for the conspiracy conviction. lannelli's second
probationary sentence was as long as that imposed for the substantive violation and was to
be served concurrently. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4-5, lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770 (1975).
7. United States v. lannelli, 477 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1973).
8. In United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), remanded on other grounds,
417 U.S. 903 (1974), the Second Circuit viewed Wharton's Rule as a problem of numbers.
Section 1955 required involvement of five persons; Wharton's Rule was limited to cases
involving only the exact number of parties necessary to the commission of the substantive
offense. Since seven persons were involved in the conspiracy, the third person exception
prevented application of the Rule. Citing Becker, the Third Circuit held in Jannelli that
Wharton's Rule could not be applied to § 1955 violations where more than five persons were
charged in the indictment. 477 F.2d at 1002. The Fourth Circuit faced a similar issue in
United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975), where
there were eleven indictees. The court did not dwell on the "numbers" aspect, but held
Wharton's Rule inapplicable because the substantive offense of gambling involved persons
such as bettors who were not participants. Since a gambling business might be operated
without the agreement of the required five persons, the conspiracy and operation of the
business were not so closely connected as to be inseparable. 477 F.2d at 985-87. In United
States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975), the Fifth
Circuit held that Wharton's Rule prevented prosecution for conspiracy only where more than
one party was necessary to perform the basic crime. The court concluded the operation of an
illegal gambling business did not require concert of action; the requirement of five or more
persons was purely jurisdictional. 489 F.2d at 558-59.
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views among the circuits as to whether the Rule applied to viola-
tions of § 1955.(1
Justice Powell, speaking for five members of the Court, felt Ian-
nelli and the other petitioners were properly convicted for conspir-
While the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits found Wharton's Rule inapplicable in
§ 1955 cases, other courts drew the opposite conclusion on similar facts. In United States v.
Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), the court reversed the
conspiracy convictions of two defendants found guilty of conspiring to violate and violating
§ 1955. Fourteen defendants were initially indicted as joint participants in the gambling
operation; after commencement of the trial, charges against one defendant were dismissed
and eleven others pleaded guilty. Thus only two were tried and found guilty on both charges.
The court stated that the two offenses could not be adequately distinguished on the basis of
the number of persons charged in the indictment. The charge of conspiracy to violate § 1955
encompassed nothing more than a necessary agreement among those committing the substan-
tive offense; a fair interpretation of congressional intent indicated the two crimes merged. The
court believed this decision was consistent with the general rule that conspiracy is a crime
separate from the individual substantive offense, since under the facts the two charges were
identical. 478 F.2d at 1026.
The Supreme Court could have based its conclusion in IanneUi on the third person "num-
bers" exception to Wharton's Rule. This would have permitted separate punishment even if
§ 1955 had been construed to require proof of guilty knowledge and design among each of at
least five participants so their conspiracy would necessarily be within the substantive crime.
The indictment charged that 25 persons had conspired to conduct an illegal gambling busi-
ness, and the jury found eight of those persons guilty of the conspiracy and of its substantive
aim. United States v. lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Even if § 1955 were read
as necessarily including a five-person conspiracy, it would not necessarily include an eight-
person conspiracy; since the larger combination presents a greater danger to society, separate
punishment for the conspiracy could be justified. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d
230 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the fact that an arbitrary number of participants is required for
jurisdictional purposes should not be the basis for a superficial identification of § 1955 of-
fenses with traditional Wharton's Rule crimes. The proper application of Wharton's Rule
should depend on the terms of the statute itself and the policy justifications underlying the
Rule, not upon whether 5, 8 or 25 persons were charged in the initial indictment for the
substantive offense.
9. lannelli v. United States, 417 U.S. 907 (1974).
10. See note 8 supra. There was also confusion as to whether the prosecution might charge
both offenses if the jury was instructed that a conviction for the substantive crime precluded
conviction for conspiracy. The classic formulation of the Rule required dismissal of the con-
spiracy indictment before trial. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1604, at 1862 (12th ed. 1932).
One district court faced with dual charges of conspiracy to violate and violation of § 1955
dismissed the indictment. United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
Under similar circumstances, the district court in United States v. Whitaker, 372 F. Supp.
154 (M.D. Pa. 1974) applied Wharton's Rule and granted acquittal on the conspiracy count.
Since that court was bound by the Third Circuit's reliance on Becker in the Iannelli decision,
see note 8 supra, it utilized the "numbers" rationale; however, the opinion clearly followed
the Seventh Circuit in Hunter when it concluded the conspiracy contained the same elements
as the completed crime. The court distinguished lannelli and Becker, where the indicted
participants numbered more than the five required by § 1955; since only five participants
were involved in the gambling business in Whitaker, Wharton's Rule barred a conspiracy
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acy and for violating § 1955."1 The Court closely scrutinized Whar-
ton's Rule, including its origin and rationale, development, and
current applicability.'" Since it was presumed Congress had knowl-
edge of common law principles existing at the time the legislation
was passed, the Court concluded Congress intented to maintain
the distinction between conspiracy and its target crime' 3 unless
Wharton's Rule provided an exception. The Rule applied only
as a judicial presumption in the absence of express contrary
legislative intent. 4 It emerged when conspiracy law was forming 5
and applied to offenses such as adultery, incest, bigamy and
dueling, which involved agreement among persons who were the
only participants in the substantive offense and thereby directly
realized all its consequences. The application of Wharton's Rule was
justified in these classic cases on grounds that commission of the
crime involved no danger to society beyond that inherent in the
offense itself.'" These so-called "victimless crimes" did not primar-
ily injure third parties and all required concert of action. 7 The Rule
did not apply, however, where the substantive crime could be com-
mitted without a conspiracy; in such case, a collective criminal
agreement would enhance the danger to the community. The con-
duct proscribed by § 1955 did not fit the traditional mold for Whar-
ton's Rule offenses, as large-scale gambling activities likely would
generate additional criminal conduct and entice participation of
others who were not parties to the conspiracy or the substantive
conviction. Id. at 159. These differences among the lower federal courts were understandable;
they faced an ill-defined but firmly established common law rule and a recent statute of broad
scope which had not yet been authoritatively construed.
11. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist
joined. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion, in part II of which Justices Stewart and
Marshall joined. Justice Brennan filed a separate dissent.
12. See text accompanying notes 31-49 infra.
13. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 594 (1961) (separate consecutive sentences
may be imposed for obstructing interstate commerce by extortion and for conspiring to do
so, because the two are separate crimes).
14. 420 U.S. at 785-86.
15. Wharton's Rule seems to be an American conception and is not applied in the English
courts. Respondent's Brief for Certiorari at 16 n.9, lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770
(1975).
16. See, e.g., People v. Purcell, 304 Ill. App. 215, 26 N.E.2d 153 (1940) (Wharton's Rule
used to discharge defendants indicted for conspiracy to play cards for money and for comple-
tion of same).
17. Comment, Gambling Under the Organized Crime Control Act: Wharton's Rule and
the Odds on Conspiracy, 59 IOWA L. REV. 452, 457 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gambling].
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offense. Those prosecuted for conspiracy need not also be prosecuted
for the substantive offense."
Since the Court viewed the Rule as an aid to determining legisla-
tive intent," Justice Powell examined the basic purpose of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970.20 The Act was designed to elimi-
nate organized crime in the United States by establishing new penal
prohibitions and providing additional methods of dealing with the
unlawful activities of organized crime offenders.2 The majority felt
the Act manifested Congress's clear awareness of the distinct nature
of a conspiracy and the substantive offenses that might constitute
its immediate end.22 For example, § 3575 specifically concerns per-
sons who enter into conspiracies to engage in patterns of criminal
conduct. The definition of "gambling activities" in § 1955, however,
makes no mention of "conspiracy" or "agreement," but merely calls
for "involvement. '23 The essence of conspiracy is agreement among
participants. Wharton's Rule applies only to offenses that require
concerted criminal activity; the conspiracy and substantive offense
are closely related because both require collective criminal conduct.
In view of the numerous references to conspiracy throughout the
Act, the limited definition in § 1955 was significant; the Act was
carefully drawn and would have indicated a merger of §§ 371 and
1955 had that been intended.
Petitioners had argued that since the participation of "five or
more persons" was an element of the substantive offense under §
1955, Congress had meant to merge the conspiracy and substantive
offense into a single crime. The Court rejected the argument; it saw
the "numbers" requirement 2 as a restriction on federal intervention
18. 420 U.S. at 784.
19. Legislative intent was emphasized in the test applied by the Court in Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), which focused on the statutory elements of an offense and
whether each provision required proof of a fact which another did not. The Court felt the test
would be satisfied in lanneUi since a violation of § 371 requires proof of a conspiracy, which
is not essential for conviction under § 1955. 420 U.S. at 785 n.17.
20. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18,
21, 28, 29, 33, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, & 50 U.S.C.).
21. See 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1073 (stating the purpose of the Act).
22. 420 U.S. at 788.
23. See note 2 supra.
24. See note 8 supra.
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into areas which were normally matters of state concern by limiting
federal criminal jurisdiction to those engaged in illicit gambling of
major proportions." Thus the majority concluded §§ 1955 and 371
were intended to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses
arising from the commission of a single act."
Justice Douglas, dissenting on statutory and constitutional27
grounds, argued simultaneous convictions under §§ 371 and 1955
could not stand. He was joined in part by Justices Stewart and
Marshall, who felt Wharton's Rule should apply because there was
no express justification for the inference that Congress intended to
permit simultaneous convictions. Section 1955 was aimed at "syndi-
cated gambling," which raised tle same social concerns as conspir-
acy; as a practical matter, § 1955 could not be violated without the
type of coordination which characterizes conspiracy." Justice Doug-
las disputed the Court's suggestion that the conspiracy statute
could be used to enhance punishment under § 1955. Congress ad-
dressed sentence enhancement in § 3575 of the Act, which author-
ized augmented punishment for felonies committed by a "danger-
ous special offender." As this section was included to improve the
rationality, consistency and effectiveness of sentencing by limiting
and guiding sentencing discretion, Justice Douglas felt it improper
to infer that § 371 could be used to enhance punishment by author-
izing additional conspiracy charges. A scheme to differentiate of-
fenders should be promulgated by Congress, not the courts. 30
25. 420 U.S. at 790 n.22, quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969). Congress
was aware of the practical effect of the number limitation: "[Section 1955] will reach only
those who prey systematically upon our citizens and whose syndicated operations are so
continuous and so substantial as to be a matter of national concern." Id.
26. 420 U.S. at 791. The Court added that the decision was not a green light allowing
separate convictions in all § 1955 cases. Each was to turn on its own particular facts. lannelli
held only that Congress meant to retain the traditional options available to prosecutors and
courts. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V was the basis of Justice Douglas' protest on constitutional
grounds. It provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Id. Justice Douglas felt the double jeopardy clause
forbade simultaneous prosecutions under §§ 1955 and 371, because the same evidence was
relied upon to establish liability under both statutes. He believed multiple prosecution would
give the Government power to increase criminal punishment at its option. 420 U.S. at 792-
93 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28. 420 U.S. at 795.
29. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 1001(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970).
30. 420 U.S. at 797 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas suggested the jury might
be instructed to defer consideration of the conspiracy charge until after deliberation on the §
1955 charge. This had been done at annelli's trial, but the instruction had also permitted
multiple convictions which the dissenters felt should be reversed. Id. at 798. Justice Douglas
1976
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Francis Wharton first formulated what has since become known
as Wharton's Rule in the second edition of his treatise on criminal
law. He reported that in Shannon v. Commonwealth,' the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court ordered dismissal of an indictment alleging
conspiracy to commit adultery brought after the state had failed to
obtain conviction for the substantive offense. Wharton indicated the
case was limited to principles of double jeopardy." The sixth edition
of Wharton's treatise stated there was no conspiracy where concert
was essential to the substantive offense, but emphasized that the
Rule should not be used beyond that class of cases." The current
edition states simply that an agreement by two persons to commit
a particular crime cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy when the
crime is of such a nature as to necessarily require the participation
of two persons for its commission. 4
The confusion as to application of Wharton's Rule by courts35
suggests a poor understanding of the Rule's relationship to the gen-
eral theory of conspiracy. The essence of conspiracy is agreement to
commit an unlawful act;36 traditionally, it has been considered a
crime separate from the completed substantive offense. 37 This dis-
tinction follows from a belief that criminal combinations pose a
further suggested that in a § 1955 prosecution conspiracy should be charged as a preparatory
offense that merges with the completed crime, and should be considered by the jury only if
it first acquits the defendant of the substantive crime. Id. at 797.
The sole basis for ,Justice Brennan's separate dissent was his agreement with the other
dissenters that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of lenity for the defendant in criminal
statutes where Congress has left the task of imputing its undeclared will to the judiciary. As
§ 1955 was silent on whether punishment for both the substantive crime and conspiracy was
intended, doubt should have been resolved in the petitioner's favor. Id. at 798 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
31. 14 Pa. 226 (1850).
32. F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 198 (2d ed. 1852).
33. 3 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 2321, at 78 (6th ed. 1868).
34. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 89, at 191 (1957).
35. In United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973) the court observed that "rather
than being a rule, [itl is a concept, the confines of which have been delineated in widely
diverse fashion by the courts." Id. at 986. In Iannelli, Justice Powell admitted that this
observation is supported by a study of the history of the Rule's application. 420 U.S. at 776.
See note 8 supra.
36. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 62, at 471 (1972).
37. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Under the early common
law, a conspiracy was a misdemeanor which merged into the completed felony. That rule was
based on the significant procedural differences between felony and misdemeanor trials. As
the procedural distinctions diminished, the merger concept lost its force and eventually
disappeared. See generally Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1961), and
sources cited therein.
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greater potential threat to the public welfare than individual acts.
Concert increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be
successfully attained and decreases the probability that the plan-
ners will abandon their goal. In addition, concerted action often
makes possible the completion of crimes more numerous and com-
plex than those which a criminal could accomplish if working
alone. :" For these reasons, Congress has adopted the common law
theory and usually imposes independent penalties for the commis-
sion of a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it.39 This
policy has distinct practical consequences for the criminal. A con-
viction for conspiracy may carry a heavier penalty than the substan-
tive offense at which the conspiracy was aimed. 0 Moreover, the
conspiracy is a completed offense as soon as the parties agree to
pursue an unlawful end and one commits an overt act in furtherance
of that end." The conspirators may be indicted and punished sepa-
rately for the conspiracy whether or not the substantive offense has
been consummated. 2 Conviction on both charges gives the criminal
a record of two felony convictions.
Wharton's Rule provides a narrow exception to the general princi-
ples of conspiracy. In certain offenses an element of the substantive
crime is an agreement or conspiracy to commit the act.4" Since the
elements of conspiracy-agreement to pursue an unlawful objective
plus an overt act-are integral to the substantive crime, it would be
impossible to commit the substantive crime without also conspiring
to do so. In these instances and in the absence of an indication of
contrary legislative intent, Wharton's Rule forbids cumulative pun-
ishment for the substantive crime and the conspiracy, as well as
prosecution for the conspiracy once the defendant has been acquit-
ted of the substantive crime."
38. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
39. Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590, 595 (1895) (Congress may separate the conspir-
acy from the act itself and affix distinct penalities to each).
40. Id. This was not the case in Iannelli, because the maximum punishment for a violation
of § 371 is less severe than for a violation of § 1955. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
41. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932) (conspiracy to violate the Mann
Act).
42. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 590 (1961); Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 643 (1946).
43. For example, the crime of dueling is defined as "a combat with deadly weapons
engaged in by two persons pursuant to an agreement to do so." 2 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 848, at 719 (1957).
44. Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850).
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The application of Wharton's Rule has several limitations. The
"third person exception" provides that a conspiracy to commit a
Wharton's Rule offense may be punished separately if it contem-
plated the cooperation of a greater number of parties than was nec-
essary to the commission of the principal offense.45 When a criminal
combination includes more persons than are required to commit the
substantive offense, the dangers of the conspiracy to society may be
increased." Another limitation is the requirement that the substan-
tive crime must have been committed; otherwise conspirators would
go unpunished. 7 Additionally, the Rule will not apply where the
substantive offense could have been committed by one person
alone, " or where the law defining the substantive crime does not
specify punishment for a necessary participant. 9
Legislatures have acquiesced in the judgments of courts applying
Wharton's Rule. Since it has remained unchanged over a consider-
able period of time, the Rule has become firmly imbedded in both
state and federal law. 0 Unless there is a clear expression to the
contrary, it is presumed Congress knew of the existing common law
when it drafted legislation. Thus when Congress outlawed certain
gambling activities in § 1955, it presumably considered whether the
activities proscribed in the substantive offense posed the same
threats that the law of conspiracy is normally thought to guard
against; if so, Wharton's Rule would merge the two offenses upon
consummation of the substantive offense absent contrary legislative
intent." Thus the threshold question in Iannelli was whether the
45. Gambling, supra note 17, at 460.
46. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
47. Gambling, supra note 17, at 458.
48. Courts have frequently refused to apply Wharton's Rule where the substantive offense
could be committed by one person alone and conviction does not depend upon proof of a
corrupt agreement among the participants. E.g., United States v. Parzow, 391 F.2d 240 (4th
Cir. 1968) (bribery of a public official); United States v. Klock, 210 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1954)
(misappropriation of bank funds); United States v. Cordo, 186 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951) (receiving stolen goods).
49. For example, a conspiracy conviction for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor would
be sustained when the statute penalizes only the seller and not the buyer. See also 1 R.
ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 89, at 193 (1957); Gambling, supra
note 17, at 459-60.
50. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 955 (1959).
51. lannelli contended that the statutory minimum of five persons must be intentional
participants, for if a minimum of five persons wilfully cooperate there must be some agree-
ment. Whatever the nature of the agreement, it was in essence a conspiracy; and Wharton's
Rule prevented duplicate convictions for the same act. Under this theory, it was error to
submit the conspiracy count to the jury because merger had occurred. Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 6-7.
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activities defined in § 1955 invoke the same concerns underlying the
law of conspiracy. If read literally, the language of § 1955 rebuts the
merger presumption because it does not mention collective agree-
ment.52 Although the statute requires involvement of five persons,
it does not provide that each be an intentional participant in the
illegal enterprise. It is sufficient to prove the criminal intent of one
person and some involvement by at least four others, however guilty
or innocent.5" A conspiracy conviction would require proof of a cor-
rupt agreement, a fact not essential for conviction of the substantive
gambling offense; this should preclude applicability of Wharton's
Rule.54 On the other hand, it might be argued that the language of
§ 1955 is ambiguous. As a practical matter the activities enumer-
ated in most cases could not be perpetrated without the agreement
which characterizes conspiracy. Hence, Wharton's Rule should be
applied absent contrary legislative intent.5
To either of these arguments, legislative intent was an important
factor. As a clear statement of congressional intent was not avail-
able, the majority inferred legislative intent to maintain separate
punishment for the two offenses from the basic purposes of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and from references to conspir-
acy in other sections. The Court concluded that if Congress had
intended to include the elements of conspiracy in § 1955, it could
easily have done so.5" Although-the Act does use conspiracy convic-
tions as a weapon against large-scale organized gambling,5" the dis-
52. See note 2 supra.
53. For example, a bookmaker may employ ten students to answer his phones, telling
them they are participating in market research assignments and must record each caller's
name and the precise number he reports. None of the students is aware the operation entails
bookmaking. Assuming the operation violates state law and has sufficient daily gross revenue
to come under § 1955, the bookmaker can be convicted of a § 1955 violation because his
business "involves five or more persons who conduct ... part of such business," 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955 (b)(l)(ii) (1970), without any need for proof of a conspiracy. Respondent's Brief for
Certiorari at 28-29.
54. This was the opinion of the majority in lannelli. 420 U.S. at 785 n.17.
55. This was argued by the dissenters. Id. at 795 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 789.
57. There is strong national policy against organized gambling on a large scale, as it is
reportedly the greatest source of profits for organized crime: PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 1-2
(1967) [hereinafter cited as ORGANIZED CRIME]. Congress was aware of the impact of illegal
gambling on American society when it enacted § 1955. See Note, Wharton's Rule and Con-
spiracy to Operate an Illegal Gambling Business, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 613, 626-27 (1973),
1976
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senting opinions pointed out an equally compelling policy consider-
ation: when the will of Congress is to be imputed by the judiciary,
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.5" Since it was un-
clear whether § 1955 affected the ability to prosecute under the
general conspiracy statute, the dissenters refused to impute a moti-
vation which would penalize the criminal defendant.
The Iannelli decision illustrates the confusion which can result
when common law concepts are left to overlap statutory law. Per-
haps this confusion can be resolved by examination of the policy
justification for Wharton's Rule and the adoption into Title 18 of a
provision which will achieve identical objectives. Originally, the
Rule was based on the double jeopardy principle that the prosecutor
should not be allowed to carve out a necessary element of a crime
and make that element another crime simply by calling it "conspir-
acy."" Punishment for both conspiracy and the consummated crime
constituted unfair and unnecessary double punishment.'" Currently,
the Model Penal Code provides that one may not be convicted of
both the substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit it.6 The
Code permits prosecution on both offenses, however, so as not to
disregard the function of conspiracy as an inchoate crime.62 Thus the
citing Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 87 (1970).
58. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (when Congress had not fixed the
punishment for a federal offense clearly, doubt should be resolved against turning a single
transaction into multiple offenses).
59. Vannata v. United States, 289 F. 424, 427 (2d Cir. 1923) presented this argument in a
case involving conspiracy and the substantive offense of selling intoxicating liquor; however,
defendant's conviction was affirmed. For a discussion of this idea see W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
CRIMINAl, LAW § 62, at 493 (1972).
60. Cf. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 595 (1961). But see United States v. Bobo,
477 F.2d 974, 986 (4th Cir. 1973) (since prosecutions for conspiracy and commission of the
substantive crime are permissible, double jeopardy can no longer be considered a valid basis
for Wharton's Rule).
61. Section 1.07 provides in pertinent part:
When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than
one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not,
however, be convicted of more than one offense if: .. .(b) one offense consists only of
a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other . . ..
MODE, PENAL CODE § 1.07(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
62. Critics of Wharton's Rule feel it disregards the social function of the crime of
conspiracy; the fact that an offense requires concert does not justify immunizing the criminal
preparation to commit it. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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Code accomplishes the purposes behind Wharton's Rule and the law
of conspiracy."1 Where defendants face a two-count prosecution
under §§ 1955 and 371, the purpose of the conspiracy charge would
be frustrated if the prosecution were required to choose between the
offenses at the outset, since Wharton's Rule only applies when the
substantive crime has been consummated 4 and this will not be
determined until the jury has reached a verdict at the conclusion of
the case."5 If the jury were instructed that it might return a verdict
of guilty on only one of the two counts, there would be no double
punishment and the underlying purpose of Wharton's Rule would
be accomplished."
Experience has shown the most effective legal tool for dealing
with organized crime is the prosecution for conspiracy. 7 This tool
can be destroyed through the use of Wharton's Rule in its tradi-
tional form. The approach of the Model Penal Code accommodates
the interests which engendered each of these concepts and elimi-
nates the difficulties in interpreting or applying the Rule to the
statutory offenses in question. Congress should consider the adop-
tion of this approach, as Iannelli's narrow holding does little to
straighten out the entanglement which has evolved around Whar-
ton's Rule.
Rosemary Kirr
63. Some states have accomplished the same result by passing legislation which bars
conviction of more than one offense for conduct designed to culminate in the commission of
the same crime. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 906 (1973).
64. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1604, at 1862 (12th ed. 1932).
65. Gambling, supra note 17, at 467.
66. It has been suggested that the trial judge should have discretion to force an election
by the prosecutor in the interest of fairness to the defendant. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW §
219, at 684 (1961).
Although lannelli was convicted on both counts, he was not prejudiced by dual punishment
because his sentences were concurrent and equal in length. This resulted, however, at the
discretion of the trial judge. Under similar circumstances, a defendant's sentence could be
greatly increased through the use of consecutive sentences unless the Model Penal Code
approach applies. See note 61 supra.
However, the approach of the Model Penal Code-to allow indictment on both offenses and
instructions to the jury to convict, if at all, on only one count-would not satisfy the argument
that the addition of a conspiracy count places the defendant at a procedural disadvantage
by giving the prosecutor more latitude in the introduction of evidence. See Developments in
the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 922 (1959). By virtue of the conspiracy
charge, the jury considers the acts and declarations of each as incriminating all, thus aiding
conviction of every defendant. Perhaps this is justified by society's interest in controlling
organized gambling, which is reportedly the greatest source of profits for organized crime.
ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 57, at 1-2.
67. ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 57, at 81.
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